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Paul
McLaughlin Introduction
The most well known differences
between Karl Marx and Mikhail Bakunin concern their attitudes toward the State:
its genesis, its ‘nature’, its relation to the economic side of affairs,
and its fate under revolutionary conditions. All of these issues are of
interest and importance. In this brief paper, however, we will focus on just
one of them: the fate of the State.
We should note initially
that while these issues of State are often taken to constitute the sole
difference between Marx and Bakunin (or between Marxism and anarchism), there
are in fact more fundamental, philosophical distinctions between Marx and
Bakunin that come into play at the level of discussion of the State. We cannot
hope to discuss them adequately here[1], but we must at least
mention the two central distinctions. In the first place, there is a logical
distinction between Bakunin’s
negative dialectic (in which sublation and mediation are excluded, so that
each dialectical product is a fulfillment of the antithetical or ‘revolutionary’)
and Marx’s affirmative dialectic (in which these aspects are retained,
so that each dialectical product preserves something of what was confronted by
the negative, that is the ‘thesis’ or, in Bakunin’s terms, the ‘reactionary’);
on this basis, Marx is, from the standpoint of ‘revolutionary logic’, what
Bakunin terms a ‘compromiser’.[2]
In the second place, there is an ontological
distinction between Bakunin’s
naturalism (his prioritization of nature, of which mankind is merely a
part) and Marx’s anthropocentrism (his
prioritization of man as, essentially, a productive mediator of nature);
Bakunin, accordingly, rejects Marx’s anthropocentric economism as
non-naturalistic and metaphysical. 1.
The ‘Transitional’ and ‘Non-Political’ States
Marx’s revolutionary
vision, unlike that of Bakunin, certainly maintains a role for the State in
some form – we can say, in sublated form. This Marxian
sublation of the State represents simultaneously: (a) the abstract (post-transitional) negation of the (as Hegel describes
it) ‘strictly political’ State[7]
(on the dubious basis of which Marxism identifies itself as genuinely
anarchist); and (b) the eternal
preservation of the arbitrarily designated ‘non-political’ State (on
the basis of which Adamiak rightly denies Marxism’s anarchism). 2.
Marx’s ‘Anarchism’: The Negative Moment
Marxian
thought represents, therefore, (a) a
revolutionary compromise, the compromising of the negative moment - in fact
the compromising of anarchism in the
form of a ‘Marxian “Anarchism”’, by the willful misrepresentation of
Marxian socialism as the true anarchism. The key passage from Marx on this
topic is the following (from 1872): ‘What all socialists understand by
anarchism is this: as soon as the goal of the proletarian movement, the
abolition of classes, is attained, the power of the State... will disappear and
governmental [or political] functions will be transformed into
simple administrative functions’.[8]
Engels reiterates (in the same year): ‘All Socialists are agreed that the political
State, and with it political authority, will disappear as a result of the
coming social revolution, that is, that public functions will lose their
political character and be transformed into simple administrative
functions of watching over the true interests of society’ (as determined by
the sociological genius).[9]
Which means that ‘Marxian “Anarchism”’ consists in the transformation
of the class-antagonistic political State, characterized by its ‘governmental
functions’, into the classless non-political State, characterized by its
‘simple administrative functions’.
Bakunin restates Marx’s
argument as follows: ‘the State, having lost its political, that is, ruling,
character, will transform itself into a totally free organization of economic
interests and communities’. But even this ‘totally free’ administration
remains a State, albeit a supposedly ‘non-political’ one. In any event, it
is a State which can never properly be brought into existence given that the required transitional post-revolutionary ‘dictatorship [that is,
the post-revolutionary State] can have [no] other objective than to perpetuate
itself’ as a political State, thereby ‘having the direct and inevitable
result of consolidating the political and economic privileges of the [new]
governing minority and the political and economic slavery of the masses’: the
result of class division and State coercion.[10]
On this transitional post-revolutionary
dictatorship, Marx writes: ‘Between capitalist and communist society [and
between the current ‘political’ State and the future ‘non-political’
State] lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of one into the
other. There corresponds to this also a political transition period in which
the State can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat’.[11]
Marx and Engels write, similarly, but much earlier, ‘the first step in the
revolution is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class’, to
bring about ‘the supremacy of the proletariat’.[12]
For Bakunin, this is the first and last step of Marxian revolution; thus the
‘transitional period’, the period in which the new ruling class gives up
its power and dissolves the ‘political’ State (or, in fact, doesn’t), is
decidedly post-revolutionary (or post-partial-revolution), that is, reactionary.
It is an abundantly positive and not a negative stage in social development,
preserving the essential characteristic of the former order: not simple
economic exploitation, but the socio-economic ‘supremacy’ of simultaneously
dominative and exploitative forces.
The point of Bakunin’s
critique is that: (i) Marx’s State can
never achieve ‘non-political’ status - since the transition required is an
impossibility; and (ii) even if (hypothetically)
such a transition could occur, the State’s ‘non-political’ status would
be a myth, since every state - including the post-transitional merely
‘administrative’ one - is a class-ridden and therefore necessarily
political / coercive entity. 3.
Marx’s Statism: The Affirmative Moment
Bakunin, then, maintains a
principle of necessary class division (and hierarchy)
within any state. Such partiality is
not merely ‘internal’; it relates not only to class division within the
State - which generates class conflict necessitating internal forms of coercion
(legal or extra-legal police coercion - coercion by the forces of law and order
- and, in extreme cases, coercion by the strongest State power, the military
itself). States are also ‘externally partial’, partial in relation to other
states. Bakunin explains: ‘whoever says State necessarily implies a
particular and limited state... State means a
state, and... a state confirms the
existence of several states, and... several
states means rivalry, jealousy, and incessant, endless war. The simplest logic
and the whole of history bear this out’.[16] ‘External partiality’
relates, therefore, to divisions among states - which generates conflict among
states necessitating military coercion. States simply cannot coexist
harmoniously on an ongoing basis; it is contrary to their expansive and
dominative, that is, imperialistic, nature. Or, in Bakunin's own words, ‘All
of history bears witness, and logic itself confirms, that two states of equal
strength cannot exist side by side. That is contrary to their nature, which
invariably and necessarily consists of and manifests itself in supremacy [a
principle at once political and economic] - and supremacy cannot tolerate
equivalence. One force must inevitably be shattered and subordinated to the
other’. Hence the militarization of the relatively strong, for the purposes
of further expansion (including that of their own economy) and subordination,
and of the relatively weak, for the purposes of immediate self-defense and
long-term supremacy. Bakunin astutely draws the parallel between this political
imperialism - the diminution of freedom - and commonplace economic imperialism
- the diminution of equality; for Bakunin, in fact, they are actually
inseparable, constituting together the essence of the ‘statist principle’ (thus
the following ‘analogy’ is far from accidental): ‘The modern State is
analogous to capitalist production and bank speculation (which ultimately
swallows up even capitalist production). For fear of bankruptcy, the latter
must constantly broaden their scope at the expense of the small-scale
production and speculation, which they swallow up; they must strive to become
unique, universal, worldwide. In just the same way the modern State, of
necessity a military State, bears within itself the inevitable ambition to
become a worldwide State... Hegemony is only a modest, possible display of this
unrealizable ambition inherent in every state. But the primary condition of
hegemony is the relative impotence and subordination of at least all
surrounding states’. The inevitable conflict between states notwithstanding,
there is the possibility of cooperation between them when their very existence
is threatened (when the principle of State is challenged), as there was between
their victims in the First International (when the principle of social
revolution was embraced): ‘By nature mutually antagonistic and utterly
irreconcilable, states can find no other grounds for joint action than the
concerted enslavement of the masses who constitute the overall basis and
purpose of their existence’. Hence ‘measures against the International
became a favorite topic of intergovernmental discussions’. It is in this
sense that Bakunin's statement ‘The State on one side, social revolution on
the other’ is intended as a factual, and not simply a logical, assertion.[17]
The State-‘administered’
society, then, is never universal for Bakunin; neither can it be classless.[18]
(From a naturalistic standpoint, once again, Bakunin abhors Marxian economism
(as anthropocentric), and can therefore draw non-economic elements, such as
fundamental relations of domination, into his analysis of social class, while still emphasizing the economic component, which
is, in any case, inseparable from it. Therefore, he rejects the notion that
mere economic equalization is in it self a corrective to a lack of liberty –
any more than mere political liberalization is a corrective to a lack of
equality.[19] Neither component, on his
account, can be realized in isolation from the other: this is the basis of his integral
vision of justice.[20]) There are at least two
social classes under the hypothetical economically-classless State: the
administering and the administered; those who direct affairs (ultimately by
coercive means), if only in the name of learnedness, and those who are directed
(by such means), in this case, on the grounds of ignorance. Adamiak concurs, noting that
‘Marx and Engels appear to have remained naively oblivious to the fact that
the specter of bureaucracy was haunting the specter of communism which, they
boldly claimed, was haunting Europe’. He adds that Bakunin ‘perspicaciously
predicted that the implementation of the Marxian blueprint for the future
society would result in a new scientific-political class, in short, that the
“classless” society of Marxian eschatology was a never-to-be-realized myth’.[21]
Thus Bakunin announces that the essentially ‘political’ Marxist ‘State [which
is, as such, in a permanent condition of ‘transition’ or, in other words,
permanently despotic] will be nothing but the highly despotic government of the
masses by a new and very small aristocracy of real or pretended scholars’,
who claim ‘to educate the people and raise them... to such a level that
government of any kind will soon become unnecessary’. It seems, therefore,
that ‘for the masses to be liberated they must first be enslaved’.[22]
Bakunin simply denies at this point that despotic means can ever lead to free
ends.
Elements of Bakunin’s
revolutionary practice and the ‘theory’, which immediately serviced it
certainly contradict this philosophical principle. However, to capriciously
exaggerate the scope of this contradiction by absolutizing it is simple
dishonesty - on the part of Bakunin scholars like Eugene Pyziur and Aileen
Kelly in particular. Kelly, evidently as little qualified in psychiatry as she
is in philosophy, diagnoses Bakunin’s ‘acute schizophrenia’: ‘while in
his anarchist tracts and his polemics with the Marxists he preached absolute
liberty, in his secret correspondence he was simultaneously defending a form of
absolute dictatorship’. (Pyziur writes in the same vein: ‘in spite of its
vitriolic anti-State phraseology, Bakunin's doctrine does in fact reintroduce
political power and does it on a scale hardly known up to his time’.[23])
Kelly concludes that a ‘strange blend of anarchism and authoritarianism...
was Bakunin's final political philosophy’.[24]
No: anarchism is Bakunin's final political philosophy. Nowhere does he defend
absolute dictatorship; that’s a fabrication. To the extent that he
contradicts his political philosophy in words, as opposed to deeds, it is in
programmatic documents, letters, etc. which relate immediately to his
contradictory deeds and simply endorse them. Nowhere does Bakunin expound an
authoritarian philosophy. The contradictions are real, and I have no intention
of denying them; but they have little if any bearing on the merits of his
practically-oriented and historically-grounded philosophy: it stands alone and
must be assessed as such (a scholarly honor that is done, it might be said, to
less radical thinkers than Bakunin[25]).
The attempt to jumble up supposedly weak elements of Bakunin’s thought (in
the case of his philosophical writings, without understanding them, and in the
case of his programmatic writings, without conceding that this limits their
significance and scope) and discreditable elements of his practical activity (after
magnifying a highly select few), and to assess his thought on these grounds is
unacceptable intellectual and scholarly procedure - though it is the norm in
his case.
For Bakunin, once again,
‘Liberty can only be created by liberty’. The only goal of despotism is to
‘perpetuate itself’. (This argument applies equally against the
social-democratic tendencies of Marxists, or their penchant for statist - and
specifically parliamentary - means in the ‘pre-revolutionary’ period.
Bakunin holds that ‘the theory of the State communists... enmeshes and
entangles its adherents, under the pretext of political tactics, in endless
accommodations with governments and the various bourgeois political parties -
that is, it thrusts them directly into reaction’. The final destination of
the social-democratic school is clear to all by now: it is the cynical and
opportunistic politics of the ‘Third Way’ which claims to overcome the
‘contradiction’ between socialism or equality and liberalism or freedom by
reducing what are in themselves, to Bakunin, abstracted half-truths to zero, by
draining all content from them. Thus, according to this account, there is no
contradiction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ social-democracy, between, in the
British context, ‘Old Labor’ and ‘New Labor’ - though the latter may be,
in the consistency of its reaction, a little more forthright (and a great deal
more efficient) than the former, for all its ‘socialist’ and
‘revolutionary’ bluster. Blairite politics are the logical culmination of
classical social-democracy. Admittedly, however, there is a degree of integrity
within the old school, for all its weaknesses, that has simply evaporated in
its successor school.)[26] 4.
Statist Means and ‘Anarchist’ Ends Many who acknowledge the influence
of anarchism on Marxism in the formulation of apparent
revolutionary ends (and many Marxists don’t even acknowledge that) have
failed to acknowledge, as Adamiak has, that the Marxist end – as far as the
State is concerned - is in fact not anarchist at all; that is, many have failed
to acknowledge that Marxism and
Bakuninian anarchism differ with respect to revolutionary ends as well as
revolutionary means. David Miller, then, speaks of anarchism and Marxism
‘Sharing the same ultimate goal’ on the one hand, and of their
‘disagreement over revolutionary methods’ on the other.[31]
George Woodcock, too, evidently misses this vital point: ‘The Marxists paid
tribute to the anarchist ideal by agreeing that the ultimate end of socialism
and communism must be the withering away of the State, but they contended that
during the period of transition the State must remain in the form of the
dictatorship of the proletariat’.[32]
To summarize, there are two
Bakuninian objections to the Marxian account: first, as regards Marxian
means, the transition to a non-political stage by means of (dictatorial)
State-authority is impossible
(therefore the Marxian State is predicted to be highly despotic); second, as regards ends, the hypothetical post-transitional society is State-ordered (that is
‘administered’ by a ‘non-political State’) anyway (therefore the
Marxian State, to the extent that it embraces post-transitional elements and
represents itself as the actualization of the Marxian revolutionary vision, is
predicted to be highly bureaucratic).
These predictions are ‘perspicacious’ indeed.
Bakunin himself summarizes
the entire argument - on the despotic-bureaucratic nature of the Marxian State
- most succinctly in the following passage: ‘There will be no more class, but
a government [or ‘administration’], and please note, an extremely
complicated [or bureaucratic] government which, not content with governing and
administering the masses politically, like all the governments of today [Bakunin
simply rejects Marx’s ‘non-political’ rhetoric here], will also
administer them economically... this will require vast knowledge [une science immense] and a lot of heads brimful of brains in the
government. It will be the reign of scientific
intelligence, the most aristocratic, despotic, arrogant, and contemptuous
of all regimes. There will be a new class,
a new hierarchy of real and
fictitious savants, and the world will be divided into a minority dominating in
the name of science [or ‘scientific socialism’] and a vast, ignorant
majority. And then let the ignorant masses beware!’[33]
This statement alone seems
to me to justify Bakunin’s own claim for himself: ‘my name will remain, and
to this name, which [Marxists] will have contributed so effectively to making
known in the world [not least, says Bakunin, by their slander], will attach the
real and legitimate glory of having been the pitiless and irreconcilable
adversary, not of their own persons, which matter very little to me, but of
their authoritarian theories and ridiculous and detestable pretensions to world
dictatorship’.[34] 5.
Objections Firstly, I could be accused of
giving Bakunin too much credit here. The fact that the history of
Marxian-inspired despotism - and it is surely, at the very least, inspired by
the (more or less) authoritarian aspects of Marxian thought (though subsequent
‘Marxist’ thought obviously bears much of the responsibility too) - is
largely congruent with Bakunin’s prognosis is not the main issue here,
difficult as it may be to ignore. What is in question is the theoretical debate
about the State, and I maintain that Marxian theory is statist, and therefore in no way anarchist, on the
grounds that it embraces the State as
a pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary means, and the
post-revolutionary, post-transitional end. To this extent, Bakunin’s
theoretical analysis seems entirely correct. This in itself need not worry the
Marxist: in itself it amounts to the claim that Marxism is Marxist. However,
Marx claims that his theory is genuinely anarchist: that it embraces the
principle of freedom as well as that of equality. The motivation for
Bakunin’s critique is not simply that Bakunin disagrees with Marx; his
critique is also motivated by Marx purporting to agree, after a fashion, with
him, or purporting to be an anarchist too, but a ‘better’ one. The notion
that a manifestly non-anarchist ‘anarchism’ is the true anarchism - that a
statist ‘anarchism’ is liberating (from the State) - is the kind of notion
that Bakunin attributes to what he calls the
compromising reactionary: it is an attempt on the part of an avowed
revolutionary to subvert the negative principle; an attempt which proves
ultimately more reactionary - more despotic and stupefying - than consistent
reaction, which at least engages ‘honestly’ with its adversary by
acknowledging it as such.[35] Secondly, I could be accused of ignoring Marx’s response to Bakunin’s critique in his Konspekt von Bakunins ‘Staatlichkeit und Anarchie’ (1874-75) as well. To me there appears to be little to ignore: it’s a simple abusive and dogmatic restatement by Marx of his position (‘when class domination ends, there will be no State in the present political sense of the word’, etc.[36]), without any effort to confront the issues raised by Bakunin. It adds up to a bare declaration that ‘I’m right, he’s wrong’. (Granted, the very nature of this text - mere marginal comments - limits Marx’s ability to entertain serious discussion. However, there is no suggestion that Marx is willing to do so: he simply refuses to acknowledge that Bakunin’s objections pose any problems at all. And surely they do, even if they can ultimately be overcome. Bakunin, in this case as in many others, deserves better.) Therefore, I can only agree with Adamiak’s description of the Konspekt as ‘remarkably ingenuous’[37] and with Peter Starr’s view, that ‘as a concise statement of the [theoretical] grounds for dispute in the Marxist / anarchist polemic that rocked the First International, Marx’s [Konspekt is] quite useless’.[38] And in this sense it seems justified to ‘ignore’ it.
Notes
[1] I discuss them
extensively in my doctoral dissertation, ‘The Philosophical Basis of
Mikhail Bakunin’s Anarchism’.
[5]
L'Empire
knouto-germanique et la Révolution sociale (Seconde livraison) (1871), Archives
Bakounine, VII, ed. Arthur
Lehning (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981), p. 132.
[8]
Quoted by David McLellan in The Thought
of Karl Marx: An Introduction, Third Edition (London: Papermac, 1995),
pp. 211, 220 [originally from Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Die angeblichen Spaltungen in der Internationale, Werke,
XVIII (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1981), p. 50]; emphasis added.
[9]
On Authority, The Marx-Engels Reader, Second Edition, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New
York: Norton, 1978), p. 732; emphasis added.
[10]
Gosudarstvennost’ i anarkhiia
(1873), Archives Bakounine, III, ed.
Arthur Lehning (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1967), pp. 148-49, 114 [translation from Statism
and Anarchy, trans. Marshall S. Shatz (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990), pp. 179, 137]; emphasis added.
[12]
Manifesto of the Communist Party
(1848), The Revolutions of 1848, ed.
David Fernbach (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), pp. 85-86.
[15]
The word ‘political’ requires caution. There is continual debate in
anarchist circles as to whether a Bakuninian equation of the State with
politics rules out an anarchist politics or revolutionary politics. [See, in
particular, The Murray Bookchin Reader, ed. Janet Biehl (Washington: Cassell,
1997), Chapter 8.] Certainly, it rules out the politics of State or
quasi-State institutions (though what exactly this implies remains open to
question). However, there may still be room for social forms of organization
that are identifiable as ‘political’ in the classical, but not the
modern-statist, sense.
Bakunin
wouldn’t quibble with this distinction, I believe. In the classical sense of (in principle) a universal (and therefore ‘true’) form of participatory politics,
his anarchism is a political
philosophy; however, in the statist
sense of partial politics – of
domination of some (the majority) by others (bogus ‘representatives’ of
‘popular’ interests, true representatives of corporate interests, etc.)
– he rejects the ‘political’ entirely. Thus the supposed contradiction
observed by Peter Marshall: ‘[Bakunin] talks of the need for the “total
abolition of politics” and yet argues that the [First International] offers
the “true politics of the workers”’ [Demanding
the Impossible: A History of Anarchism (London: Fontana Press, 1993), p.
265]. This may be semantically troublesome, but there is no real
contradiction involved. Nevertheless, for semantic ease, it may be better to
refer to the anarchist philosophy as social
(and universal as such) rather than
political (and partial in the ordinary sense of this word). This, at any rate, is
how the words are understood in this paper.
When
Bakunin says that the State is political by definition, therefore, he means
that it is necessarily a partial (dominative and exploitative) institution.
This is evidenced by, for example, his repeated distinctions between the
‘social-revolutionary’ project of the anarchists and the
‘political-revolutionary’ project of their ‘bourgeois’ (liberal or
socialist) opponents. [See,
for exemple, Trois Conférences faites
aux Ouvriers du Val de Saint-Imier (1871), Archives
Bakounine, VI, ed. Arthur
Lehning (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), pp. 217-45].
[16]
Ecrit contre Marx (1872), Archives
Bakounine, II, ed. Arthur Lehning (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1965), p. 202;
emphasis in original.
[17]
Gosudarstvennost’ i anarkhiia,
pp. 52-53, 11-12, 3, 17 [Statism and
Anarchy, pp. 63, 13-14, 3, 20].
[18]
Bakunin summarizes this in Organisation
de l’Internationale (1871): ‘whoever speaks of a State thus
necessarily speaks of more than one State [that is, of a partial
principle] – oppressive and
exploitative internally, mutually hostile if not seeking conquest externally
– and so is negating [the universal
principle of] humanity’ [translated in The
Basic Bakunin: Writings 1869-1871, ed. Robert M. Cutler (Buffalo:
Prometheus Books, 1992), p. 141]; emphasis added.
[19]
‘[We] know, from painful experience, that without liberty there can be
neither dignity nor prosperity for man. But [we] do not conceive of liberty
other than in equality; because liberty in inequality is privilege, that is
to say, the pleasure of some based on the suffering’ of others [La
Double Grève de Genève (1869), Le
Socialisme libertaire, ed. Fernand Rude (Paris: Denoël, 1973), p. 67].
[20]
‘... there is but one way for justice to triumph, that is, the most
complete liberty of each in the most perfect equality of all’ [L’Instruction
intégrale (1869), Le Socialisme
libertaire, pp. 137-38].
[23]
The Doctrine of Anarchism of Michael A.
Bakunin (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1955), p. 146.
[24]
Mikhail Bakunin: A Study in the
Psychology and Politics of Utopianism (Oxford: Oxford University Press),
p. 193.
[25]
See Howard H. Harriott, ‘Defensible Anarchy?’, International
Philosophy Quarterly, XXXIII (1993), p. 319-20, note 2.
[28]
Fédéralisme,
socialisme et antithéologisme (1867), Oeuvres, I, ed. Max
Nettlau (Paris: Stock, 1972), p. 102.
[32]
Anarchism: A History of Libertarian
Ideas and Movements (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975), p. 158.
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